# First Off

**A. Interpretation – economic engagement requires expanding bilateral economic relations**

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations - is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

**This means the plan has to be government-to-government – not private economic engagement**

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

**‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership**

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

**B. Violation – the plan [uses an intermediary / targets civil society / removes a barrier to private engagement]**

**C. Voting issue –**

**1. limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any 3rd party intermediary, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible**

**2. negative ground – formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations disads and counterplans that test ‘engagement’**

# Next off

#### Chinese leading party is turning to Cuba to insure economic growth

Global Times 6/2/13 (6/2/2013, Global Times, Senior CPC official looks to expansion of China-Cuba cooperation, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786078.shtml#.Ube0__nvu9E>)

A senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official said in Havana Saturday China was willing to expand cooperation with Cuba in various fields to promote both countries' economic development.

Cuba was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic ties with China, Guo Jinlong, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, said when he met Mercedes Lopez Acea, vice president of the Cuban Council of State and first secretary of the Havana Provincial Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP).

Guo said the CPC was ready to maintain high-level exchanges with the CCP and share experience in state governance and party building.

As twin cities and capitals, Beijing was willing to work jointly with Havana to deepen cooperation and expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges, said Guo, who is also secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee.

Lopez said the relationship between Cuba and China, which was based on mutual understanding and mutual respect, had become a model of bilateral ties.

Each country faced the task of building socialism with its own national characteristics, she said, adding Cuba was ready to further boost exchanges and cooperation with China.

Guo also met Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, vice president of the Cuban Council of Ministers, on Thursday afternoon.

A CPC delegation led by Guo arrived here Thursday. He will also visit Brazil.

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is high and stabilizing – increased US engagement will trade-off with Chinese involvement

Watson 09 Professor of Strategy at National War College [Cynthia A. Watson, U.S. Responses to China’s Growing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]

CONCLUSIONS

Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past fi ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in Latin America reflects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China.

But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin America–U.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin America’s experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership.

The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benefit for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benefit from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conflicts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me.

The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is significant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about China’s growing power are already rising in the United States.

At the same time, Washington’s ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijing’s best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where China’s biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the ‘rock star’ role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors.

#### Chinese lead in Latin American economies are vital to maintain their economic growth.

Arnson et al. ‘9(Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf>) (JN)

China’s role in Latin America is, above all, based on trade, despite U.S. concerns about China’s military inﬂuence in Latin America. The major exception to this rule is Cuba, for which China represents a political relationship as well as one based on economic interests. Although Venezuelan authorities may also prefer that its relationship with China have political as well as economic dimensions, it is not clear that China has the same expectations of its relationship with Venezuela. To China, Latin America represents a signiﬁcant source of the necessary natural resources that will help China maintain its economic growth. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods.

#### Sustained economic growth prevents social unrest that would collapse the ruling party – that would cause great power war.

**Kane 01** [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm>]

Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.

# Next off

**WTO engaging bilateral trade treaties to counter protectionism – effective strategy**

**Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 13** (“The rise of protectionism And the implications for doing business,” *Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer*, <http://www.freshfields.com/en/insights/The_rise_of_protectionism/>, 7/10/2013, SLiu)

The rise of protectionism. And the implications for doing business The World Trade Organisation has identified a rise in protectionism prompted by the global economic slowdown. The WTO sees this as a 'worrying trend' that could stall growth and make recovery more difficult. In this seminar, we look at trade restrictions and other hurdles you might face when doing business. International partners from our competition and global arbitration groups will join us to discuss how best to manage these issues – including through the use of bilateral investment treaties – as well as looking at how best to recover any losses.

Free trade sucks up water supplies causing international conflict risk to increase over scarcity

Owens 2012 (Brian Owens is an experienced journalist and editor working on the leading science journal Nature and the influential policy magazines Research Fortnight and Research Europe. “World’s water footprint linked to free trade”, <http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/02/world%E2%80%99s-water-footprint-linked-to-free-trade.html>)

World’s water footprint linked to free trade. More than one-fifth of the world’s water supplies go towards crops and commodities produced for export, a new study reports. As developed nations import water-intensive goods from overseas, they place pressure on finite resources in areas where water governance and conservation policies are often lacking. Researchers from the Netherlands have quantified and mapped the global water footprint, highlighting how patterns in international commerce create disparities in water use. The new study, published today in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, presents a spatial analysis of water consumption and pollution based on worldwide trade indicators, demographic data and water-usage statistics. Arjen Hoekstra, a water management analyst at the University of Twente in Enschede, Netherlands, and lead author of the study, says that water supplies follow the flow of goods around the world. Water consumption and pollution, he says, “are directly tied to the global economy”. However, Hoekstra suggests that water is rarely included in measures of economic and environmental production costs. Part of the problem is that so much of global water use is indirect. For example, to produce one kilogram of beef requires as much as 15,400 litres of water when issues such as grazing are taken into account, according to the Water Footprint Network, a Dutch non-profit organization for which Hoekstra serves as scientific director. Another confounding issue is that global water supplies come not only from groundwater sources, but also from rainfall, a factor that has been largely excluded from previous analyses. Whereas research has indicated that agriculture accounts for roughly 70% of the global water footprint, the new data hold agriculture responsible for as much as 92% of worldwide water consumption and degradation. Precipitation is crucial to food production, says Dieter Gerten, a hydrologist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany, but it is a “hidden resource” and typically left out of research and water-use planning. Ruth Mathews, executive director of the Water Footprint Network, says that the detailed analysis can aid countries and private firms in understanding the real magnitude of their consumption. Companies, she suggests, often account only for their operational costs. But if an agricultural product, such as cotton or sugar, is a component of a final good, such as blue jeans or soda, “there’s a huge amount of indirect water use”. Gerten describes the new findings as significant in calling attention to “the increasing disconnect” between production, regional water use and global consumer markets. He suggests that countries tend to focus on national resources while relying increasingly on water-intensive imports, effectively offshoring their water consumption. As globalization binds countries in increasingly complex relationships, the risks of scarcity and resource degradation become not just regional but international concerns. Gerten says that future research and policy planning “cannot neglect the importance of these dependencies”.

# Next off

**Latin America is a key site for resisting neoliberal expansion**

EMIR **SADER,** PhD Poli Sci Univ of Sau Paolo THE WEAKEST LINK? Neoliberalism in Latin America New Left Review 52, July-August 200**8** <http://newleftreview.org/II/52/emir-sader-the-weakest-link-neoliberalism-in-latin-america>

The new century is off to a surprising start in Latin America. The continent that had been a privileged territory for neoliberalism, where it was first applied—in Chile and Bolivia—**rapidly turned into the leading arena not only for resistance but for construction of alternatives to neoliberalism.** Two faces of the same coin: precisely by having been the laboratory for neoliberal experiments, Latin America is now having to deal with their consequences. The 1990s and the 2000s have been two radically opposite decades. During the 90s, the neoliberal model was imposed to varying degrees in virtually every country on the continent—with the exception of Cuba. Clinton, who did not even cross the Rio Grande to sign the first North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), was forced not long after to approve a super-loan from Washington when the first crisis of the new model broke out in Mexico. The US went on to press for a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), presenting this as the natural outcome of the seamless extension of free-trade policies. At an Americas summit meeting in Canada in 2000, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez was the only leader to vote against Clinton’s proposal for an FTAA, while Cardoso, Menem, Fujimori and their colleagues fell meekly into line. On the occasion of his first Ibero-American Summit, Chávez reported, Castro passed him a piece of paper on which he had written: ‘At last I’m not the only devil around here.’ It was thus with some relief, too, that Chávez—himself elected president of Venezuela in 1998—attended the investiture of Lula in Brasilia and Néstor Kirchner in Buenos Aires in 2003, before moving on to that of Tabaré Vázquez in Montevideo in 2004, that of Evo Morales in La Paz in 2006, and in 2007 those of Daniel Ortega in Managua and Rafael Correa in Quito; followed in 2008 by Fernando Lugo in Asunción. Meanwhile the US free-trade proposal that had been almost unanimously approved in 2000 was dead and buried by 2004. Since that date, Chávez himself has been re-elected, as was Lula in 2006; in April of this year, Kirchner was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernández, and Lugo triumphed in Paraguay, putting an end to more than sixty years of rule by the Colorado Party. What is the meaning of this radical reversal, faster than any the continent has experienced before, to give the largest number of progressive governments, whether left or centre-left, that it has seen in its entire history? It is true that the continent displays the highest levels of inequality in the world, an income gap aggravated by the neoliberal decade; and yet the hard blows that punished past popular struggles, along with the solidity of the neoliberal establishment, made such a rapid turn quite unexpected. In what follows we shall atte

**Neoliberalism is dying in Latin America- we should resist attempts at triage like the affirmative**

 Dr. Ronn **Pineo**, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Towson University – Posted on April 11, 20**13** - See more at: http://www.coha.org/22227/#sthash.L5CsywQs.dpuf

Poverty in Latin America has been reduced substantially in the last three decades. In the late 1980s, nearly half of Latin America’s population lived in poverty. Today the fraction is about a third. [21] This marks important progress, and it has continued in some area nations. However, it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2008, poverty contracted most in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina, countries which had largely **abandoned neoliberalism**; in Brazil, which had at least partially rejected neoliberalism; and in only two other states, Honduras and Perú, which still remained, at least partially, committed to free market polices. [22] It was mostly factors **beyond economic policy** that helps to account for recent declines in the rate of Latin American poverty. One factor was increasing remittances from Latin Americans laboring in the developed world, especially in the United States. Total remittances from Latin American workers rose from $12 billion USD in 1995, to $45 billion in 2004, and $68 billion in 2006. [23] However, “by far the main contributor to the reduction in the poverty rate,” as Jaime Ros has noted, was “the fall in the dependency ratio.” [24] The indicator measures the number of non-working age people—children and the elderly—who are supported by the working age population. The higher the dependency number, the greater the economic burden. Source: foreignpolicyblogs.com Latin America’s past demographic history underlies this shift in the dependency ratio. The late 1940s in Latin America witnessed lower overall death rates (the number of people who died a year divided by the total population), especially due to lower infant and childhood mortality rates. Initially, birth rates stayed high even as death rates fell, but after a generation passed Latin America’s birth rates began to drift downward to match the lower death rates. The time gap between the fall in death rates beginning in the late 1940s and the eventual fall in birth rates by the late 1970s resulted in an unprecedented population explosion. Latin America’s population rose from 167 million in 1950 to 285 million by 1970. As this population cohort has aged, Latin America’s dependency ratio fell too, dropping from a very high rate of 87.3 in the years 1965-1970, to 55.0 for 2005-2010, an all-time low for the region. The people born during the population explosion are of working age now, bringing the region a historic but one-time economic advantage, the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend.” As a result, Latin America temporarily enjoys a situation of a very large number of workers providing for a greatly reduced number of dependent people. The region’s demographic bonus means that there is, for the moment, less poverty due, in large part, to the increased number of working age people per household. [25] A drop in the dependency ratio carries with it greater female participation in the workforce, for lower fertility means there are fewer children to care for, freeing women to enter the paid workforce. Lower fertility also means better overall lifetime health for women, resulting in more years spent in the paid workforce for adult females. The fertility rate (the number of children born per woman per year) fell in Latin America from 5.6 for the years from 1965 to1970, to 2.4 for the years 2005 to 2010. The resulting demographic bonus has provided a significant, but fleeting, economic asset. By 2025, as the current population ages, Latin America will need to support a very large elderly dependent population. [26] It is fair to conclude that the reduction of poverty in Latin America in recent years was produced mainly by some short-term victories in the commodity lottery (as explained in Part I, the commodity lottery refers to short-term price rises for selected raw material exports), as well as a spike in remittances, and most of all, a one-time reduction in the dependency ratio. Income inequality data for Latin America is less positive. In the 1980s and 1990s, inequality increased significantly in Latin America. For example, from 1984 to 1994, the income of the top 10 percent of the Mexico’s population rose by 21 percent, while the income of the country’s bottom 10 percent fell by 23 percent. Nevertheless, there have been improvements, albeit modest ones, in lowering the Gini coefficient (a measure of economic inequality with 0 being the least inequality—everyone has the same income, and 1.0 being the most inequality—one person has all the income). Source: norlarnet.uio.no From 2002 to 2008, the Gini coefficient improved in seven Latin American states; five of these seven countries—Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay—have traveled the farthest in rejecting neoliberalism. Outside of these nations inequality stayed the same or even increased, including in the largely neoliberal states of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Latin Americans earned 363 times more than the poorest 1 percent. By 1995, it was 417 times more. Latin America continues to show, by far, the greatest income inequality of any region in the world. Of the 15 most unequal economies in the world today, 10 are in the area. If Latin America’s income were only as unevenly distributed as that of Eastern Europe or South Asia, its recent economic growth, though sometimes anemic, would have reduced the percentage of those living in poverty to 3 percent of the population. [27] The Economist, in its 2010 review of the Latin American economic situation, concluded that the region was “well on the way to building middle-class societies.” [28] The evidence, however, contradicts this assertion. The informal sector—where people arrange irregular employment in itinerant retail sales, as day workers, or other loosely arranged jobs—today accounts for more than half of all workers in Latin America. More than eight of ten new jobs in Latin America are in the informal sector. [29] Informal sector workers enjoy no protective regulation or benefits. They live by their wits, striving to scratch out a living, day by day. Meanwhile, union membership among active workers in Latin America fell from around one-fourth in the 1980s to under one-sixth in the 1990s. Source: laht.com Moreover, significant areas of severe poverty remain in Latin America, expressed along class, racial, gender, and regional divides Poverty underlies poor health, contributing to elevated rates of infant, childhood, and maternal mortality. Of those living in poverty in Latin America, nearly half are children. Due to their undernourishment, a quarter of Latin American children (and as many as half in rural Perú and Guatemala) are stunted in their development. Across Latin America malnutrition is an underlying cause in more than half of the deaths of children under the age of five. In Guatemala maternal mortality among indigenous women is 83 percent higher than the national average. Among the poorest fifth of the Perú’s population, 85 percent of births are not attended by trained personnel, compared to only 4 percent among the wealthiest fifth. Two-thirds of Latin American municipalities do not treat their sewage prior to dumping it into adjacent rivers or the sea. In Panamá, three in ten homes lack access to improved sanitation (sewage disposal), and in Perú, nearly four in ten lack this essential service. Yet with all this effluvium flowing out, still three-quarters of Latin America municipalities do not check public drinking water supplies for impurities. One-quarter of Latin Americans do not have in-home potable water. [30] In Latin America nearly two-thirds of hospital admissions are due to diseases related to the lack of sanitation. Diarrhea accounts for six of every ten deaths of children under the age of five in Latin America. Fresh water can save lives; for each percentage point increase in potable water coverage, the infant mortality rate drops 1 death per 1,000 live births. Yet, Latin America is falling behind in terms of life expectancy. Life expectancy in Latin America was five years longer than East Asia in the mid-1960s, but by the mid-1990s, it was 1.2 years shorter. [31] The weight of this evidence leads to an inescapable conclusion. Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has put it most succinctly, “Over the last three decades, economists…provid[ed]…theoretical justifications for financial deregulation and the unrestrained pursuit of short-term profits…[T]hey advanced theories that justified the policies that have led to slower growth…[and] higher inequality…[**E]conomics has been worse than irrelevant. Economics, as it has been practiced in the last three decades, has been positively harmful for most people**.” [32] The Twilight of Neoliberalism “There is no alternative [to free market policies],” the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once pronounced, but across Latin America, there has been a steady erosion of support for the free market model. At present three-quarters of Latin America governments can be fairly characterized as being governed by center-left or left-oriented leaders. Moreover, there has been a far-reaching reassessment of the relevance of IMF advice, especially after the organization’s punishingly controversial response to the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis. The Asian economic meltdown brought the reflexive recommendations from the IMF in the form of harsh austerity measures. However, the pro-cyclical policies demanded by the IMF of its client states so plainly worsened the economic situation and needlessly caused considerable human misery that the IMF’s reputation was badly damaged. In the wake of IMF’s subsequent mishandling of the 1998 economic crises in Russia and Brazil, large private lenders, especially among the European ones, stopped requiring IMF assurances that borrowing nations follow neoliberal strictures. As Richard Peet has noted, “the…[IMF]’s reputation has never recovered, even in circles that the Fund values. [...] The power of the IMF has been reduced by failed crisis management, [with] countries paying up as quickly as possible and distancing themselves” from the IMF. [33] European lenders concluded that new loans to non-neoliberal Latin American states would perform handsomely, which, in fact, they have. The IMF’s power to impose neoliberal policies on debtor nations has been seriously compromised. Source: herslookingatyousquid.worldpress.com Argentina, following its severe economic crisis in 2001-2002, proved that a nation could successfully challenge the IMF. Argentina defaulted on its $100 billion USD foreign debt and renegotiated its obligations, paying off its loans at a fraction of the original cost. Buenos Aires finished retiring its debt to the IMF in 2005, benefitting greatly from Venezuelan assistance. In offering the money, the late Hugo Chávez promised that, “if additional help is needed to help Argentina finally free itself from the claws of the International Monetary Fund, Argentina can count on us.” [34] Other Latin American nations looked on as Argentina defied the IMF, and continued to watch as Argentina’s economy soared, growing faster than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere after it abandoned IMF-imposed economic policies. Soon a stampede of those flouting IMF mandates followed, with each new defection providing courage to all those nations rejecting neoliberalism. Other international lenders appeared as well. Venezuela loaned money to other countries in the region, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, but only if they ignored the counsel of the IMF. The Bank of the South, established in 2007, joined Venezuela with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay as an alternative source for credit. China, which does not particularly care what the IMF recommends, is also supplying capital. Furthermore, some primary commodity export prices have increased, in part due to the demand for Chinese imports (for example, Argentine soya). This has allowed several Latin American states to build up their financial reserves, making new foreign borrowing less pressing. Today the IMF can coerce only the most feeble economies, mainly now in sub-Sahara Africa. The political landscape has shifted too. By the late 1990s, many of the aging left-wing political parties built around organized labor had been flattened by the assault on unions mounted under neoliberalism. At first voters were willing to give candidates who supported the neoliberal program a chance; nevertheless, as it became increasingly clear that these policies were failing, those who spoke out against neoliberalism were elected in growing numbers. The trouble was that once in office they too often carried out neoliberal programs anyway, as for example with Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997) or Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005) in Ecuador, either because they secretly favored such policies, because the IMF persuaded them to do so, or both. With the traditional left-leaning parties marginalized in several countries and the abandonment of anti-neoliberal promises by elected politicians, ordinary citizens had to develop new political methods to defend themselves. Neoliberal policies so savaged the working class, as well as the urban marginalized and the hard-pressed peasantry, that they had no choice but to organize and fight back. To this end, they created new organizations and, in some cases, used them to seize power. By pressing the neoliberal agenda, the Latin American élites appeared to have overplayed their hand, and they paid for it by losing control of governments that they had controlled for many years, in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and beyond. A 2009 Latinobarómetro Survey found that support for democracy (as preferable to all other forms of government) was the strongest in countries that flatly rejected neoliberalism. Of the top five nations in popular support of democracy, four were governed by progressive leaders: Venezuela, Bolivia, Uruguay, and El Salvador. [35] Hope for the Future? Supporters of the free market approach have continued to counsel patience. They argue that stronger economic growth will eventually come, and that all will benefit in the long run. While neoliberal reforms might cause some short-term belt tightening, defenders explain that such adjustments, though sometimes painful, are necessary for the greatest good. We should not give in to “reform fatigue,” but should stay the course. [36] But neoliberal policies have been in place for over 30 years now. How long is the long run? How long must we wait? As John Maynard Keynes famously observed, “In the long run we are all dead.” In 1937 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt observed, “We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals. We know now that it is bad economics.” [37] The age of neoliberalism is ending. It is time for some good economics.

Growth is not equality – Latin American’s history of capital distribution precludes solvency and spillover

Ramos, 96 – (Joseph R., Center for Latin American Studies, “On Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: A Neostructural Perspective,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 2/3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/166365)//HO

Latin America was "born," from the very start, with a highly concentrated distribution of income. The ownership of mines was notably concentrated in just a few hands, as were the grants of land. Of equal importance was the fact that access to labor - a guaranteed supply, on favorable terms - was also highly concentrated, thereby making the abundant supply of cheap land much more valuable than would otherwise have been the case. Over time, this initial concentration of wealth tended either to perpetuate itself or to become even more unequal via the skewed distribution of human capital, which it induced, on the one hand, and through its interplay with "demand side" factors on the other. In effect, the skewed distribution of income led to a strong demand for sophisticated, custom-designed, manufactured goods, which were often more readily satisfied either by imports or by production utilizing less-technologically-advanced techniques. This was in marked contrast to countries with a more equitable distribution of income, where the demand was satisfied by relatively standardized, mass-produced, manufactured goods. Until the 20th century and the advent of greater political democracy, public policy - via its weak tax policy, low level of spending on human capital, and wholesale (versus selective) protection of domestic industry - acted to reinforce, rather than weaken, tendencies to concentration. As a result, only a fraction of firms in Latin America come close to utilizing "best practice" technologies, as opposed to the vast majority, who not only use outmoded methods and equipment for production, but also pay the bulk of their workers at the same low level corresponding to the low levels of productivity thus engendered. So long as this continues, not only will economic progress continue to be slow, but income distribution will remain highly regressive.

#### Poverty and ecological destruction place humanity on a path to extinction

Perrings, Professor of Environmental Economics at Arizona State University 87 (Charles, “AN OPTIMAL PATH TO EXTINCTION? Poverty and Resource Degradation in the Open Agrarian Economy “, Journal of Development Economics 30, 1987, http://www.public.asu.edu/~cperring/Perrings,%20JDE%20(1989).pdf)//AS

Famine is evidence of extreme poverty. Since the work of Sen (1981) we may be reasonably confident that it is not necessarily evidence of the collapse of agricultural or pastoral output - food availability decline. This paper suggests, however, an even more disturbing causal relationship between extreme poverty and the state of agricultural or pastoral resources in open agrarian economies that is worth further study. It now seems clear that the dynamics of open agrarian economies are rather more complex than the early (quasi) stable equilibrium models of such as Leibenstein would suggest, and that causality between poverty and resource degradation can run both ways. We have seen, for example, that a collapse in the trade entitlements of agrarian producers may prompt them to increase the level of intensity with which the land is exploited even if this imposes costs in terms of reduced productivity in the future. In the extreme case where the system is both locally and globally unstable, these costs can be fatal. Indeed, if we apply the logic of exhaustible resource theory to the problem, given the distorting effects of poverty, we cannot avoid the conclusion that in the Sahelian and similar cases people have set themselves on to what Pearce has called an ‘optimal path to extinction’. The collective response has been to avert disaster so far as possible by emergency relief, but this will do nothing to avert a recurrence of the problem in the future. Yet, if the source of the problem is the opening of agrarian economies dependent on fragile ecological systems, the solution ought to lie in the arena of trade and transfers. The compensation principle is, for example, a powerful ally in arguments for aid in cases where the gains from trade are uniformly negative for one county. By this principle trade will always be superior to autarky since there exist a system of transfers that would ensure that everyone could be made better off. But the compensation, has to be made if trade is not to impoverish rather than enrich. The appropriation of the gains from trade in the advanced industrial economies, with occasional disbursements of aid or emergency relief to the traditional agrarian economies in times of famine, is no guarantee against the collapse of 7Given the objective described in the text, such a time path would not contradict Bellman’s principle of optimality. The latter requires that whatever the initial state and decision are, the remaining decisions at any point in the path must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision. Each segment of the time path must itself be optimal, no matter what <as gone on before. fn this case the optimal policy requires quite simply that the individual maintain consumption at the minimum subsistence level by dissaving for as long as possible. C. Perrings, Poverty and agrarian resource degradation 23 the latter. The problem, as Sen points out, lines in the entitlements of agrarian producers in these economies. It is of crucial importance to secure a set of entitlements - whether by appeal to the compensation principle or not \_ that will provide those producers with the incentives to operate at sustainable levels, and to search out forms of insurance against environmental fluctuations that do not themselves undermine the potential gains from trade.

**Unchecked neoliberal expansions risks extinction**

**Nhanenge 7** [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT]

There is today an increasing critique of economic development, whether it takes place in the North or in the South. Although the world on average generates more and more wealth, the riches do not appear to "trickle down" to the poor and improve their material well-being. Instead, poverty and economic inequality is growing. Despite the existence of development aid for more than half a century, the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World. Instead, militarism, dictatorship and human repression is multiplied. Since the mid 1970, the critique of global economic activities has intensified due to the escalating deterioration of the natural environment. Modernization, industrialisation and its economic activities have been directly linked to increased scarcity of natural resources and generation of pollution, which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air. The latter threat is of great significance, because without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not be able to survive. Most people believed that modernization of the world would improve material well-being for all. However, faced with its negative side effects and the real threat of extinction, one must conclude that somewhere along the way "progress" went astray. Instead of material plenty, economic development generated a violent, unhealthy and unequal world. It is a world where a small minority live in material luxury, while millions of people live in misery. These poor people are marginalized by the global economic system. They are forced to survive from degraded environments; they live without personal or social security; they live in abject poverty, with hunger, malnutrition and sickness; and they have no possibility to speak up for themselves and demand a fair share of the world's resources. The majority of these people are women, children, traditional peoples, tribal peoples, people of colour and materially poor people (called women and Others). They are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development imposed by the North. It is this scenario, which is the subject of the dissertation. The overall aim is consequently to discuss the unjustified domination of women, Others and nature and to show how the domination of women and Others is interconnected with the domination of nature. A good place to start a discussion about domination of women, Others and nature is to disclose how they disproportionately must carry the negative effects from global economic development. The below discussion is therefore meant to give an idea of the "flip-side" of modernisation. It gives a gloomy picture of what "progress" and its focus on economic growth has meant for women, poor people and the natural environment. The various complex and inter-connected, negative impacts have been ordered into four crises. The categorization is inspired by Paul Ekins and his 1992 book "A new world order; grassroots movements for global change". In it, Ekins argues that humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the high level of military spending. The second crisis is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and poverty. The third crisis is the environmental degradation. Pollution, destruction of ecosystems and extinction of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat. The fourth crisis is repression and denial of fundamental human rights by governments, which prevents people from developing their potential. It is highly likely that one may add more crises to these four, or categorize them differently, however, Ekins's division is suitable for the present purpose. (Ekins 1992: 1).

Our alternative is to vote negative to reject the affirmative as a refusal to participate in activities which support capitalism. We must hollow out capitalist structures by refusing to invest our energy in reforms and rescue operations—avoids transition wars

Herod 4-Social Activist since 1968, owns an awesome website, Attended Columbia University and spent a year abroad at the University of Beirut (Lebanon) [James, Getting Free, 2004, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm]

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and *start participating* in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing everything we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There *is* no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must *want something else* and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction.

# Case

**Food shortages high now—either non-unique or no terminal impact**

**Britt 11** (Robert Roy, Editor in Chief TechMediaNetwork, http://www.livescience.com/14447-global-food-shortage-urgent-climate-global-warming.html, KF)

**A** growing **global food shortage has caused prices to double in recent years**, and a growing consensus of scientists now blames climate change as one factor in an equation that includes a burgeoning population and increasingly scarce water supplies. **More people around the planet are going hungry** as a result. Even as prices have also risen in the United States, most residents may not grasp the scope and severity of the problem. Americans toss about 40 percent of their food in the garbage, according to a 2009 study. In this country, food waste per person has increased 50 percent since 1974. Yet **one in seven people go to bed hungry every night,** according to the United Nations World Food Program. **Hunger kills more people than AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combined. The problem is worst in developing countries**. But the problem has implications beyond the borders of those poor countries.

**2 more reasons**

**A). Warming**

**Britt 11** (Robert Roy, Editor in Chief TechMediaNetwork, http://www.livescience.com/14447-global-food-shortage-urgent-climate-global-warming.html, KF)

**Scientists have been predicting** for years **that a warmer planet** coupled with increasing water demands **could cause food shortages**. A study in 2007, building on and confirming previous research, warned that **climate change could help cause food shortages leading to war**. Other scientists have predicted that water shortages will fuel war. **The situation became acute in 2008 when food shortages helped fuel uprisings in several poorer countries.** High food prices played a role in the ouster of the Haitian government that year. Meanwhile, a consensus had emerged that food prices would likely double by the year 2080. That projection has been blown out of the water. **Global food prices have spiked since the year 2000**, mostly since 2006, with some key crops doubling.

**B). Population growth**

**Britt 11** (Robert Roy, Editor in Chief TechMediaNetwork, http://www.livescience.com/14447-global-food-shortage-urgent-climate-global-warming.html, KF)

Today (June 5), The New York Times provided an extensive look at a world struggling to feed itself. **After interviews with dozens of** scientists, farmers and food industry **experts, the article confirmed** what many experts have been saying: **World population growth is outpacing food production, particularly with the four crops that provide the bulk of the world's nutrition: wheat, rice, corn and soybeans**. As studies have shown previously, **there's little land left to convert to farming**, water supplies are drying up, and global warming is wreaking havoc on the growing seasons and contributing to weather extremes that destroy crops.

**Impacts are exaggerated- international humanitarian aid prevents escalation**

**The Times 3** (Michael Dynes, staff, 1/22, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article852501.ece, KF)

ENLES SINDOMBA, an impoverished mother of eight from Kabumbwe village in Zambia’s drought-stricken Southern Province, insists that her family has eaten nothing for four weeks. “It’s terrible,” she said. “There is no food in the village, and **it hasn’t rained here for a month.” But none** of her family **shows any ill-effects from such deprivation.** Mrs Sindomba is still able to breast-feed her child. She concedes that **when she says she has not eaten for a month, she really means that she has not eaten any maize. The family still have chickens, goats and a few cattle. They are hungry, but a long way from starvation**. It is almost a year since the United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) first alerted the international community to the threat of millions of people dying from a looming famine in southern Africa. But the most relevant question now is whether **the international aid agencies have exaggerated the danger.**

**No extinction from disease**

**Gladwell 99** (Malcolm, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 31-32)

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but **every strategy carries a corresponding cost** and **this makes human counterattack possible**. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. **Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not**, well, **superhuman. They cannot do everything at once**. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of **alarmists** such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they **neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.**

**Momentum changing – diseases can be eliminated.**

**Paulson, ’11** – senior writer for Humanosphere and NPR

[Tom Paulson, blogger for Humanosphere and senior writer for National Public Radio; “Which four diseases face total eradication? Bill Foege predicts extension of smallpox success;” published 6/28/2011; <http://humanosphere.kplu.org/2011/06/bill-foege-on-disease-eradication-on-the-world/>; Jay]

Smallpox was, until today, the only disease that had ever been eradicated from the planet. The United Nations today declared that [rinderpest](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/health/28rinderpest.html%20%5C%20_blank), a cattle disease that when prevalent had profound adverse impact on humanity, is now the second disease to have been eradicated. Bill Foege, one of our local boys made good, is a big fan of disease eradication. Foege is the world-renowned physician who figured out the strategy that succeeded in wiping out smallpox. He is featured in an interview on disease eradication on PRI’s The World today “[How to Kill a KIller Disease](http://www.world-science.org/forum/how-to-kill-a-killer-disease-smallpox-foege/%20%5C%20_blank).” Here’s a story I did almost a year ago about [Foege on the 30th anniversary of the eradication of smallpox](http://humanosphere.kplu.org/2010/08/how-smallpox-got-beat-why-it-matters/%20%5C%20_blank). You may notice that PRI used the same photo — a photo I took of Bill in Colville, Eastern Washington, where he grew up. Foege, a former chief of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and now a senior adviser to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, has written a fascinating book on the global campaign to eradicate smallpox called “[House on Fire.](http://www.amazon.com/House-Fire-Eradicate-Smallpox-California/dp/0520268369/ref%3Dsr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1309290994&sr=8-1-spell%20\%20_blank)” On PRI, he predicted that four more diseases will be eradicated soon. “I think maybe six diseases will be eradicated before I die,” said Foege, listing the next four as polio, guinea worm, measles and onchocerciasis (river blindness). What about malaria? “Malaria may take a little longer … but we need to try to eradicate malaria and I’m very optimistic about it,” he said.

**Impacts of disease exaggerated – not enough momentum to kill humanity.**

**Lind, ’11 –** policydirector at the New America Foundation

[Michael Lind, policy director of the New America Foundation's Economic Growth Program; “So Long, Chicken Little;” published in Foreign Policy, March/April 2011; <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/so_long_chicken_little?page=0,8>; Jay]

There's nothing like a good plague to get journalists and pundits in a frenzy. Although the threat of global pandemics is real, it's all too often exaggerated. In the last few years, the world has experienced two such pandemics, the avian flu (H5N1) and swine flu (H1N1). Both fell far short of the apocalyptic vision of a new Black Death cutting huge swaths of mortality with its remorseless scythe. Out of a global population of more than 6 billion people, 8,768 are estimated to have died from swine flu, 306 from avian flu. And yet it was not just the BBC [ominously informing](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8022437.stm%20%5C%20_blank%20%5C%20Five%20new%20UK%20flu%20cases%20confirmed%20%7C%20BBC%20News%2C%20April%2028%2C%202009) us that "the deadly swine flu … cannot be contained." Like warnings about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the good done by mobilizing people to address the problem must be weighed against the danger of apocalypse fatigue on the part of a public subjected to endless Chicken Little scares.